Base value · computed onchain
0
violation count ≤ 0
Counterexample bounty protocol
An agent puts MON behind a measurable rule. A challenger gets paid for proving one permitted case where that committed rule breaks. A deterministic recomputer settles the result onchain.
Dissent recomputed the violation onchain, refuted the rule and released the bounty. Replay the completed challenge below.
Monad's execution budget lets the deterministic recomputation and settlement happen onchain, while the bounty, result and payout stay publicly inspectable. This is a completed Mainnet settlement, not evidence of external adoption or an external security audit. A separate earlier cycle was recorded on Monad Testnet; the receipts in case D-001 below are Mainnet receipts.
0x59c55b…476dd0Open receipt ↗
First Mainnet case · Alnitak's river rule
Base value · computed onchain
0
violation count ≤ 0
Evidence seal · hidden scenario
SEALED
Hidden until the reveal window
The challenger commits a hash of the evidence and locks a deposit. The scenario remains hidden until reveal.
This replays a completed Mainnet case. Verify its receipts at the end.What just happened
Alnitak's old rule said call. Under the stronger opponent model already specified by the recomputer, that call fell below the promised safety margin. The recomputer returned violation 1 against the allowed maximum 0. Dissent credited the 3.00 MON bounty plus the returned 0.10 MON deposit. The challenger then withdrew the full 3.10 MON credit.
This tests a specific historical v1 rule, not all of Alnitak. The rule was developed after observing part of the history; prospective validation and external audit remain pending. The four Mainnet transactions cost 3.138113844 MON in gas. The challenger spent 3.088395576 MON in gas, received the 3.00 MON bounty and recovered its 0.10 MON deposit, so this execution ended 0.088395576 MON below its starting balance.
Reading Monad Mainnet
Four receipts, the ChallengeSucceeded event, the challenger withdrawal and the final contract state are being checked.
Five narrative phases map to four transactions: evidence revealed and rule refuted share the successful reveal receipt.
Zero means the initial rule input contains no counterexample; it is not a probability or proof that the agent is universally safe. For this historical hand, the exact old-model equity was 56.8942%, above the required 42.4170%, so the old gate would allow the call. Under the pressure model specified by this recomputer, exact equity was 32.0046%: below that same required margin. The recomputer therefore returns 1. These are model-based numbers, not proof of the opponent's actual cards. No LLM judges the submitted evidence.
Illustrative boundary explorer
Move the conditioned equity across the case's recorded threshold. This browser control explains the boundary; it does not call the recomputer and cannot submit evidence.
Not an onchain computation. The deployed recomputer derives equity from cards, ranges and the action trace. It does not accept this slider as evidence.
The protocol, not the poker
DissentCore binds a rule, a threshold and a bounty. It does not know cards, risk models or prices. Meaning lives in a bounded, deterministic recomputer registered with the rule.
Poker and an Aqueous escrow rule now have completed Mainnet cases. Risk scores, prices and spending limits remain possible domains, not integrations we have validated.
Kanmani contributed the Aqueous recomputer. Together we completed a coordinated Mainnet demonstration, not an organic customer deployment.
Kanmani × Dissent · coordinated Mainnet case · 10 Oct 2026
The rule: no listed flat USDC job may pay the agent before an onchain delivery record exists.
Kanmani's buyer deliberately released one Aqueous payment early. Its recomputer read the escrow record and returned 1 against the allowed maximum 0. Dissent credited the challenger, who withdrew 0.85 MON: the 0.75 MON bounty plus the 0.10 MON deposit returned.
This is a working example beyond poker: attach a funded, challengeable rule to a specific set of agent payment records.
A listed job was paid with no delivery recorded. This tests an onchain record, not whether real-world work was completed.
Asuran contributed the domain implementation and tests. Dissent's integration review covered token constraints, buyer control and the execution flow.
Alnitak signed the challenge from a separate wallet. The contract accepted the evidence and made the bounty and deposit available for withdrawal.
Demonstration boundaries: Kanmani controlled both buyer and agent and intentionally triggered the early release. This was not a discovered exploit, proof of agent misconduct, an external audit or evidence of customer demand. The delivery-first control is not part of this completed case.
DissentCore · Aqueous recomputer · Review and joint confirmation on GitHub
Recorded challenger gas across seal, reveal and withdrawal: 0.275069431 MON. The 0.85 MON withdrawal includes the original deposit; it is not net profit. These costs describe this run, not a future quote.
Monad is built to expand what the EVM can execute. Dissent uses that execution headroom to rerun a bounded rule and settle its bounty in one public onchain flow.
On Mainnet, the complete path is recorded: commit, sealed evidence, deterministic recomputation and withdrawal.
Bind the rule and fund the bounty.
Hide the counterexample until reveal.
Run the registered rule onchain.
Move the bounty when the boundary breaks.
Where Dissent fits
The agent publishes a precise output and boundary.
A bounded deterministic program can test the evidence.
The protected value exceeds the cost of finding and proving the break.
Dissent does not judge intentions or open-ended language. Demand from independent users is not yet established.
Scope and limits
The recorded Mainnet flow committed a rule, accepted one valid counterexample and credited 3.10 MON.
No external audit or established customer demand. The Kanmani integration is a coordinated demonstration. Risk and pricing integrations are not built.
Trust boundary
Dissent is not an oracle of truth. The registry fixes the approved recomputer, its code hash, deposit and execution bounds. That prevents silent code replacement; it does not prove the domain rule is correct. The Mainnet recomputer has not undergone an external audit.