DISSENT COUNTEREXAMPLE BOUNTIES
Recorded on Monad Mainnet

Counterexample bounty protocol

Agents make rules.
Dissent funds the objection.

An agent puts MON behind a measurable rule. A challenger gets paid for proving one permitted case where that committed rule breaks. A deterministic recomputer settles the result onchain.

CASE D-001 · MAINNET A challenger broke the agent's rule. 3.10 MON The contract credited and the challenger withdrew the payout.
COMPLETED MAINNET RESULT A challenger found an allowed hand where Alnitak's call fell below the rule's required safety margin.

Dissent recomputed the violation onchain, refuted the rule and released the bounty. Replay the completed challenge below.

WHY MONAD

Monad's execution budget lets the deterministic recomputation and settlement happen onchain, while the bounty, result and payout stay publicly inspectable. This is a completed Mainnet settlement, not evidence of external adoption or an external security audit. A separate earlier cycle was recorded on Monad Testnet; the receipts in case D-001 below are Mainnet receipts.

ARCHIVE / D-001 ALNITAK RIVER SAFETY V1 Recorded on Monad Mainnet · chain ID 143
RULE COMMITTED01 / 05
BLOCK108,439,200
Reveal window: not opened
TRANSACTION The agent commits the rule and locks 3.00 MON.
0x59c55b…476dd0Open receipt ↗

First Mainnet case · Alnitak's river rule

Can one real hand break the agent's rule?

AGREED RULE Violation must stay ≤ 0. A valid result above 0 breaks the rule. The contract binds a fixed onchain checker, called the recomputer, at commit.

Base value · computed onchain

0

violation count ≤ 0

Rule holds

Evidence seal · hidden scenario

SEALED

Hidden until the reveal window

Waiting
Agent bounty3.00 MON locked
Challenger0.10 MON deposit

The challenger commits a hash of the evidence and locks a deposit. The scenario remains hidden until reveal.

This replays a completed Mainnet case. Verify its receipts at the end.

Illustrative boundary explorer

See where this recorded rule changes.

Move the conditioned equity across the case's recorded threshold. This browser control explains the boundary; it does not call the recomputer and cannot submit evidence.

Not an onchain computation. The deployed recomputer derives equity from cards, ranges and the action trace. It does not accept this slider as evidence.

CONDITIONED EQUITY 32.00% Recorded threshold: 42.4170%
25%60%
ILLUSTRATIVE RESULT1 · RULE BREAKS

The protocol, not the poker

One hand proved the mechanism.
Every new domain must prove its rule.

DissentCore binds a rule, a threshold and a bounty. It does not know cards, risk models or prices. Meaning lives in a bounded, deterministic recomputer registered with the rule.

Poker and an Aqueous escrow rule now have completed Mainnet cases. Risk scores, prices and spending limits remain possible domains, not integrations we have validated.

01 DissentCore Escrow · sealed challenge · settlement
02 IRecomputer recompute · validate · scale · domain
03 Domain recomputer Poker and escrow records · each domain defines its own rule

Kanmani contributed the Aqueous recomputer. Together we completed a coordinated Mainnet demonstration, not an organic customer deployment.

Kanmani × Dissent · coordinated Mainnet case · 10 Oct 2026

Paid before delivery.
A rule that can be challenged.

The rule: no listed flat USDC job may pay the agent before an onchain delivery record exists.

Kanmani's buyer deliberately released one Aqueous payment early. Its recomputer read the escrow record and returned 1 against the allowed maximum 0. Dissent credited the challenger, who withdrew 0.85 MON: the 0.75 MON bounty plus the 0.10 MON deposit returned.

This is a working example beyond poker: attach a funded, challengeable rule to a specific set of agent payment records.

RECORD

Aqueous escrow

A listed job was paid with no delivery recorded. This tests an onchain record, not whether real-world work was completed.

RULE

Kanmani recomputer

Asuran contributed the domain implementation and tests. Dissent's integration review covered token constraints, buyer control and the execution flow.

SETTLEMENT

Dissent bounty

Alnitak signed the challenge from a separate wallet. The contract accepted the evidence and made the bounty and deposit available for withdrawal.

Demonstration boundaries: Kanmani controlled both buyer and agent and intentionally triggered the early release. This was not a discovered exploit, proof of agent misconduct, an external audit or evidence of customer demand. The delivery-first control is not part of this completed case.

Inspect the five Mainnet receipts and collaboration record
  1. Rule committed · 0.75 MON bountyBlock 112,091,732
  2. Buyer released payment before deliveryBlock 112,091,768
  3. Evidence sealed · 0.10 MON depositBlock 112,092,838
  4. Challenge succeeded · 1 against 0Block 112,094,390
  5. 0.85 MON withdrawn · no pending challenger credit at completionBlock 112,095,190

DissentCore · Aqueous recomputer · Review and joint confirmation on GitHub

Recorded challenger gas across seal, reveal and withdrawal: 0.275069431 MON. The 0.85 MON withdrawal includes the original deposit; it is not net profit. These costs describe this run, not a future quote.

Monad Why Monad

A challenge should settle where the rule lives.

Monad is built to expand what the EVM can execute. Dissent uses that execution headroom to rerun a bounded rule and settle its bounty in one public onchain flow.

On Mainnet, the complete path is recorded: commit, sealed evidence, deterministic recomputation and withdrawal.

01

Commit

Bind the rule and fund the bounty.

02

Seal

Hide the counterexample until reveal.

03

Recompute

Run the registered rule onchain.

04

Settle

Move the bounty when the boundary breaks.

Where Dissent fits

Measurable boundary. Reproducible break. Enough value to defend.

01

Measurable

The agent publishes a precise output and boundary.

02

Recomputable

A bounded deterministic program can test the evidence.

03

Worth challenging

The protected value exceeds the cost of finding and proving the break.

Dissent does not judge intentions or open-ended language. Demand from independent users is not yet established.

Scope and limits

What this proves. What it does not.

PROVED

The recorded Mainnet flow committed a rule, accepted one valid counterexample and credited 3.10 MON.

NOT PROVED

No external audit or established customer demand. The Kanmani integration is a coordinated demonstration. Risk and pricing integrations are not built.

Trust boundary

The protocol executes the committed mechanism.
The recomputer defines the meaning.

Dissent is not an oracle of truth. The registry fixes the approved recomputer, its code hash, deposit and execution bounds. That prevents silent code replacement; it does not prove the domain rule is correct. The Mainnet recomputer has not undergone an external audit.

DISSENT Fund the objection. Verify the break. Settle on Monad. Build a recomputer →